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1. INTRODUCTION
Insufficient investment is being made in protected areas, and innovative approaches are required for
generating the additional financial support required (Li, 1995; Newcomb, 1995; WRI, 1989).  The
need for additional resources arises from the imbalance between a country's needs for managing
protected areas on the one hand, and the ability of the country to mobilize resources on the other.
Resources can be augmented through existing mechanisms such as the fiscal system, user charges,
resource rent capture, and privatization, as well as through new mechanisms such as environmental
taxes, betterment charges, and so forth.  Even so, it appears that domestic resources in most
developing countries will continue to be inadequate for financing the conservation of biodiversity
due to the limited tax and capital base of many of these countries, their under-developed taxation
systems, and the need to direct resources to more urgent development priorities.  Figure 1 lists
reasons why external financial resources are needed for protected areas.
The financial needs of individual countries for managing protected areas depend critically on what
is assumed about national and international policies (Panayotou, 1995). Trying to finance protected
areas under current policy conditions, which include market failures and inappropriate incentives,
will require unattainable levels of funding.  This is the case because the world is currently spending
about US$1 trillion in direct and indirect subsidies of energy, water, agrochemicals, marginal
agriculture, deforestation, and heavily polluting industries that undermine protected area
management.  Without correcting these distortions, additional funding for protected areas is likely
to be futile.
Correcting these inappropriate policies could reduce the financial needs for protected areas.
Further, both the policy reforms and the more appropriate determination of prices are likely to save
financial resources and generate new funding, thereby further reducing the need for additional
resources.
FIGURE 1: WHY EXTERNAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES ARE NEEDED FOR
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PROTECTED AREAS
• Equity.  Many of the benefits of protected areas flow to all citizens of the world, while
the costs tend to fall on the countries with only limited financial resources.
• Capital constraints.  Due to insufficient capital in at least some developing countries,
external financing is needed to bridge the gap between the demand (both private and
public) for protected area management and the domestic supply of funding to support
that management.
• Cash flow.  While many investments in protected areas will provide substantial benefits,
these are often long-term and the full benefits may not be realized for many years,
while the costs need to be paid today, necessitating long-term bridge financing which is
difficult to obtain in developing countries.
• Supporting policy reform.  Financing is often required to cushion the short-term impacts
of policy reforms required to move toward sustainable use of biological resources, or to
pay compensation to those adversely affected by the new policies, or to build consensus
for the reforms.
• Covering foreign exchange components.  Many investments in protected areas may
involve foreign exchange components, to build the confidence of investors and to
leverage domestic sources of financing; generating foreign exchange by exploiting
biological resources may be contrary to protected area objectives, while external
investment may reduce the need for such exploitation.
• Benefits.  Payment for conservation services provided to the global community by
developing countries; or avoiding irreversible losses of biodiversity when countries are
poor that may be highly valued after those countries become more wealthy.
This paper surveys the current situation, present trends, and promising innovations in the financing of
protected areas, emphasizing innovative tools that are relatively poorly known.  This paper seeks to
enlist the widest range of investors who could (and should) have a hand in crafting and using these
tools.  They include the full spectrum of those active, and potentially active, in protected areas.
Once the necessary policies are in place, it is then necessary to understand the motivations of each
investor important for conservation of biodiversity; this will allow for more accurate predictions of
future income streams and requirements.  Future increases in financing will most likely come from
broadening the range of investors to include as yet untested partnerships, so an appreciation of each
investor's real interest is a prerequisite to growth in financing.
2. SOURCES OF FINANCE AND POLICY LEVERAGE
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Financial support for protected areas has increased in recent years primarily through greater
cooperation among four principal investors: the international community; governments; the private
sector; and NGOs.
Each of the categories of investors wields differential influence through their financial resources and
through their role in formulating policies. Governments clearly have the lead role in formulating
policies, being sovereign over their own protected areas.  The international community has
considerable influence through the provision of funds through the Global Environment Facility.  The
International Monetary Fund can have profound influences on policy through its structural adjustment
loans. The private sector has significant influence through its patterns of investment.  International
NGOs can play an influential role in affecting policy, even though the financial means they are able to
generate are relatively limited, while local NGOs are likely to be especially influential at the grassroots
level, with their policy influence limited by a lack of resources.
The private sector's potential is the least tapped.  Most of the tools that require the private sector are
being led by international businesses.  But as national companies or subsidiaries of multinationals gain
more resources, the potential of their role will grow both in partnership with international companies
and on their own.  The challenge is how to form partnerships between relevant government agencies
and the private sector, drawing on lessons learned from experience with these partnerships in both
developed and developing countries (Jennings, 1995).
Developed countries have a long tradition of corporate and private support for social and community
needs.  Tax laws were written specifically to encourage corporate charity by enabling corporations and
individuals to take tax deductions for contributions of cash, property, and services to non-profit
organizations that fit broad criteria for public service.  In recent decades, corporations have learned
that they can benefit in other ways from being "corporate good citizens."  Many corporations engaged
in the production of goods and services see their charitable activities as giving them as much public
relations value as paid advertising; others will see investments in protected areas as being sound
business decisions which yield benefits in terms of ensuring supplies of raw materials, access to
markets, and long-term social, political, and economic stability.
Both a medium-term analysis of where growth in economic and political power will come, as well as a
long-term analysis of where the conservation challenges will lie, point to the for-profit private sector as
key.  The analysis of tools that follows seeks to identify several ways to build bridges between those
investors currently committed to protected areas and those who could become so within the short to
medium term.
3. FINANCING PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNING
SYSTEM CAN INITIATE
The international governing system -- involving the United Nations system, the World Bank, the
regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, and international conventions --  has the
lead responsibility to generate additional funding at the global level. The Global Environment Facility,
operated by its own secretariat and implemented by the World Bank, United Nations Development
Programme, and the United Nations Environment Programme, is the interim Financial Mechanism of
the Convention on Biological Diversity.  The GEF allocated over US$300 million to biodiversity in its
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pilot phase and has doubled its level of investment in its first three-year implementation phase.  These
funds are being spent subject to an Operational Strategy developed by the GEF Secretariat, which in
turn was based on direction provided by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD.  But it is also clear
that the funding generated by the GEF will not be sufficient to meet all of the needs for investments in
protected areas.  Additional funds are required from the international level.  At least some of this
funding should also serve to stimulate increased investment at the national level (as discussed in more
detail in section 4).
The globalization of the marketplace, enabled or facilitated by the international governing system, has
led to numerous transnational economic activities that depend on global resources to generate
increasingly vast streams of income and other benefits which do not accrue through rents or returns to
the appropriate factors of production.  Correcting this market failure through tapping a small part of
these streams for purposes which provide global benefits could result in a more logical and efficient
allocation of global income (though the failure may not be simply that of the market).  This section
suggests a few possibilities.
3.1. Charging for Use of the Global Commons
The global commons is that part of our planet which belongs to all of humanity.  It includes the oceans
beyond the exclusive economic zones, the ocean floor, outer space including the geostationary and
lower orbits, the electro-magnetic spectrum, and biodiversity (in its general sense); some consider
Antarctica and the Southern Oceans to be a global commons as well, but this is disputed by some
claimant states.  These global commons have considerable economic value.  The oceans provide nearly
90 million tons of fish per year, serve as a means of transport, help regulate the climate, and are a
major carbon sink.  Outer space provides the traffic lanes for satellites which enable global
communications to be so efficient, and which provide masses of data on natural resources.  The
electro-magnetic spectrum serves as a means of international telecommunications, without which the
global market would be difficult to imagine.
The global commons continue being misused or over-used, at least partly because they are still
perceived as "free" resources.  Bezanson and Mendez (1995) point to the need to manage the global
commons and to charge for their contributions to the various transnational activities that use them.
They call for a system of user rights, regulations, rents, and charges as a way of governing the
commons and using them to generate revenues.  At least a portion of these revenues should be
allocated for conservation purposes, perhaps through payments directly to the Financial Mechanism of
the CBD.
Clearly, the use of the global commons is a major political issue, but it already is generating significant
economic benefits.  The challenge is to find ways to ensure that those realizing benefits also pay at
least some of the costs of conservation, including support to protected areas.
3.2. Joint Implementation
As outlined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the basic premise of Joint
Implementation (JI) is to enable voluntary cooperation between two or more countries with the aim of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions as cost-effectively as possible.  In most cases, JI projects will
involve countries where mitigation costs are relatively low in order to maximize the possible global
benefits, enabling countries with high marginal costs to invest in countries where greater reduction of
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greenhouse gas could be achieved for the same level of funding; JI offers countries with limited or
expensive mitigation options the opportunity to pursue more cost-effective mitigation opportunities
elsewhere, thereby dramatically reducing the costs of achieving a given net reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions.  The COP of the Framework Convention on Climate Change has insisted that Joint
Implementation financing is to be additional to the financial obligations of industrialized countries and
existing official development assistance flows, reinforcing the crucial role of the private sector in any
success the Joint Implementation system is to enjoy (Trexler, 1995).  The effects of such investments
on protected areas could be significant.
On the positive side, any efforts to slow climate change will likely be a net benefit for protected areas.
More specifically, the activities being implemented may be managed to provide significant benefits for
protected areas; for example, funds invested by an industrial country for carbon sequestration in a
tropical country may involve reforestation with native species of trees, thereby expanding the area of
habitat and contributing to the maintenance of biodiversity (Figure 2).  While it is generally agreed that
forestry-based mitigation efforts are only a relatively small part of the climate change mitigation
portfolio, they are worth mentioning here because of their potential impact on protected areas.
FIGURE 2: SUPPORT FROM JOINT IMPLEMENTATION FOR PROTECTED
AREAS
While Joint Implementation is designed to help implement the Climate Change Convention,
well-designed JI projects can provide significant benefits to protected areas.  Examples
include:
• rehabilitating and protecting of important watershed areas;
• reducing the extent and frequency of illegal logging in protected areas by increasing the
capability and effectiveness of management;
• involving local populations in such activities and provide alternative sources of timber;
• regenerating and rehabilitating forests in biologically valuable habitats;
• purchasing land to add to protected area systems in areas of biologically-rich forest.
Two categories of JI projects may have especially significant impacts on biodiversity: carbon sink
enhancement; and changing agricultural practices.  Enhancing carbon sinks involves the reduction of
net anthropogenic releases of carbon through carbon fixation in biomass or changes in land use and
management practices.  Such so-called "carbon offsets" have the potential to modify and improve
management practices, to the benefit of protected areas.  Options for mitigating climate change include
slowing deforestation through improved forest protection and slowing of conversion of forest to
agricultural land; and increasing forest and tree cover on existing lands, thus enlarging living terrestrial
carbon reservoirs.  The rate of on-going forest loss suggests that significantly slowing or stopping
deforestation in the coming decades would probably have a more sizeable and immediate impact on the
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than any conceivable tree-planting effort, with forest
conservation plausibly keeping tens of billions of tons of carbon out of the atmosphere over the next
several decades (Trexler, 1995).
Despite some of the administrative and practical challenges of Joint Implementation, the sources of
funding may be significant and will be largely outside of the usual sources of funding available for
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protected areas. Note that this use of financing from carbon offsets will lead to economic development
in tropical countries -- a feature bound to make it more attractive politically.
Many international environmental groups and developing country governments continue to express
scepticism about allowing carbon dioxide emitters to avoid emissions reductions by relying on carbon
offsets and Joint Implementation (Sierra Club, 1995).  Others have voiced the fear that pursuit of
forestry-based Joint Implementation projects could turn entire countries into forest reserves and
national parks (Trexler, 1995). Sceptics question whether individual areas of forest otherwise would
have been cleared.  Crucial questions which need to be asked include: Can forest areas truly under
threat of loss be identified?  Once they are identified, can they truly be protected?  How does one
prove that exploitative pressure has not simply been displaced to another parcel, with no net carbon
implications?  Clearly, Joint Implementation needs to be seen as just one part of an overall approach
to improved forest management, and conservation of biodiversity.
4. FINANCING PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS GOVERNMENTS CAN INITIATE
The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes that each government needs to provide financial
support and incentives to implement the objectives of the CBD, within the capacity of each
government (Article 20).  All governments have conflicting demands on the available financial
resources, and will need to ensure that expenditures in support of the CBD are able to compete
successfully with other demands.  Several new approaches to generating funds will serve to support
the objectives of the CBD in the field of protected areas, even if the funds generated are not directly
provided to the government agencies assigned to implement the Convention.  It is clear that
governments can use policy instruments to change the ways that funds are being raised and spent in
order to make them more consistent with the CBD.  Many of these "green funding mechanisms" can
both generate funds for protected areas and change behaviour of individuals and institutions to make
them more "biodiversity-friendly".
Costa Rica offers a precedent-setting example of the use of one kind of effective charge that serves to
benefit protected areas: a water user fee (Repetto, 1986).  The idea is to levy a tax on the use of
water by utilities and irrigation districts and apply that tax to the maintenance of forested watersheds.
The government is considering charging approximately $6 million/year to the national water
company and $3 million/year to the national electric power company.  These fees would yield an
income of approximately $7/hectare/year for management of the 1.3 million hectares of forest land
in watersheds.
4.1.  Environmental Taxes and Charges
The potential for environmental, or "green" taxes is great in many countries (Broadway and Flatters,
1993; Bruce and Ellis, 1993; OECD, 1993).  A carbon tax already has been collected on the use of
fossil fuels in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.  Other uses of tax policy
could also contribute.  Governments could decide to provide tax deductions to private landowners
trying to preserve biodiversity on their own lands, as is already being done in Australia, Canada, and
several African countries (McNeely, 1993).  Such a tax deduction would help mitigate costs of
habitat conservation, including opportunity costs.  It might also be possible to reduce or eliminate
taxation on ecologically important land where the owner commits to conserving it in its natural state
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(Clark and Downes, 1995).  On the other hand, taxes could be increased on activities that threaten
protected areas thus helping to ensure that the costs of environmental damage are internalized.
Business is predictably unenthusiastic about proposals to tax the sales of pharmaceuticals, timber, or
seeds, contending that as taxes are unhypothecated, there is no guarantee that the revenues will
achieve efficient conservation results, and additional revenues would more appropriately be levied
from society as a whole.  Irrespective of the merits of these arguments, the political reality is that the
introduction of such taxes is unlikely under current conditions in most countries (ten Kate, 1995).
Considerable income can be generated for protected areas through direct charges.  For example, the
revenue from tourism to Kenya's Wildlife Service in 1989 amounted to US$18 million.  Chitwan
National Park in Nepal earns over US$1 million per year from entry fees, elephant rides, and
royalties from tourist hotels.  In Zambia, revenues from safari hunting amounted to US$1.3 million
in 1990, of which $510,000 is returned to wildlife management and $440,000 is allocated to
community projects such as the installation of maize grinding mills. This is a small proportion of the
funds actually generated by the protected areas.  For example, Wells (1993) conservatively estimates
that US$ 27 million of total tourist expenditure in Nepal was attributable to the protected area
network in 1988, when the cost of managing the parks were less than $ 5 million but direct fees
collected from tourists visiting the protected areas amounted to less than $1 million.  These figures
suggest the parks are a good investment, though the costs of park management were more than five
times the revenues collected by the Government from park tourists.
The main barrier to the wider use of these taxes and fees in supporting protected areas lies in the
mismatch between locations of protected areas in remote areas far removed from the mainstream of
national economic activity and users who can afford to pay a meaningful fee.  Thus, governments
will need an additional incentive to apply fees across watershed boundaries.  One such incentive can
come from the value of a reputation as a pioneer in this field.  The first few countries that make a
serious attempt to implement a water-based fee system for support of forest management and
conservation, for example, will likely see additional donor support.
4.2. Tradeable Permits
Panayotou (1995) has proposed the idea of internationally Tradeable Conservation Credits (TCC) as
an instrument for widening the market for biodiversity values beyond their direct use value to
extractive industries.  Recent work on the value of protected areas (e.g., Pearce and Moran, 1994;
Barbier et al., 1994) indicate that the indirect use value and non-use values of protected areas
generate far greater willingness to pay by the general public than the use values implied by the rather
thin market in bioprospecting.  However, no marketable instrument is currently available for
capturing these non-use values other than voluntary contributions to NGOs.
As conceived by Panayotou (1995), tropical countries could allocate habitats protected areas for
biodiversity conservation and divide each habitat into a number of TCCs of a particular size.  Each
TCC would state the location, condition, diversity, and degree of protection of the habitat and any
special rights that it conveys to the buyer or holder.  TCCs could then be offered for sale both locally
and internationally at an initial offer price that covers fully the opportunity costs of the corresponding
land unit plus an appropriate mark-up.  The potential buyers of TCCs include local and international
organizations, local and international foundations, and corporations, developed country governments,
chemical and pharmaceutical companies, scientific societies, university and research institutions, and
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even individuals in the developed countries who are conservation-minded.  Motivations for
purchasing TCCs would vary among the prospective buyers, ranging from direct use values such as
prospecting for new chemicals or pharmaceuticals, to non-use values such as conservation or
tourism.  Others might buy and hold TCCs as an investment, if they expect them to rise in value as a
result of decreasing supply and increasing demand for biodiversity in the future.
Developed countries could stimulate the demand for TCCs by providing credits to domestic firms
and property owners for the acquisition of TCCs from developing countries against domestic
environmental regulations such as forest harvesting and replanting regulations, or by introducing a
conservation tax and then allowing people the option to pay this annual tax or to purchase and hold
TCCs from conservation in lieu of the tax.  A TCC could involve declaring a fragile ecosystem as a
protected area which is closed to certain agricultural practices or forms of development, obviously
with the consent of the communities involved because they would gain economic benefits from
behaviour which is in the national and global interest.  This financing mechanism has the great
advantage for protected areas in the tropics by making the opportunity costs clear and providing a
vehicle for the beneficiaries to pay them.  Panayotou (1995) considers that it has the potential to raise
billions of dollars for biodiversity without compromising national control and sovereignty over
resources.
5. FINANCING PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN INITIATE
In 1996, private financial flows to developing countries reached nearly US$260 billion, far more
than the $56 billion in development assistance.  The private sector has profound influences on
biodiversity through its use of resources, trading patterns, and marketing.  Many private-sector
investors are already deeply involved in biodiversity, holding extensive areas of land important for
conservation, promoting bioprospecting (see below), carrying out biodiversity-related research, and
supporting conservation efforts in the field.  Exxon, for example, has recently made a US$5 million
grant to support conservation of the tiger in Asia (its advertising symbol).  Many industries are
becoming much more "green" and therefore useful potential partners in protected area management.
This trend is most strongly seen in the industrialized countries, but many developing countries are
seeking to promote rapid economic expansion, with the consequences that the local business sector
will increasingly have the resources to contribute to protected areas, and the emerging consumer class
will have the interest, influence, and resources to support national conservation efforts.  This
assumption leads to a focus on identifying incentives for the for-profit private sector to play a greater
role in the financing of protected areas.  If the private sector can become a full partner, then the
world could see a new era of conservation -- an era in which civil societies have the will and the
means to assume an effective stewardship over their own resources, biodiversity included.
Already, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), Keidanren in Japan, and many others are channelling substantial private
sector resources to provide business leadership for change towards sustainable development and to
promote the attainment of high standards of environmental and resource management in business.
Many individual companies are working on innovative approaches to ensuring that their activities
preserve fragile ecosystems, even when mineral extraction is involved.
5.1. Transfer of Development Rights and Credits
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The real potential of JI (as discussed in Section 3.2) as a funding source for biodiversity conservation
projects lies in the private sector of industrialized countries, including electric utilities, automobile
manufacturers, and chemical manufacturers who may find the potential cost-effectiveness of carbon
offsets to be an attractive alternative to facility-specific emissions reductions (Trexler, 1995).
5.2. Prospecting Rights and Biological Royalties
Conservationists have long cited the untapped potential of rainforest species for yielding useful drugs
as a reason for saving tropical forests (Eisner and Beiring, 1994; Mendelsohn and Balick, 1995).
Within the last few years a number of partnerships have been formed to try to develop this potential
to the point where new drugs, derived from naturally occurring compounds, are on the market.
These have been discussed elsewhere (Sittenfeld and Gámez, 1993; Reid, 1992; Acharya, 1995; ten
Kate, 1995; Simpson, 1995), so will  not be discussed further here.
5.3. "Green" Business Investments in Protected Areas
World trade patterns are changing rapidly.  Many environmental NGOs are lobbying for more study
to understand possible environmental consequences of new trade regimes such as will be fostered by
treaties such as NAFTA and GATT.  These groups seek to use these agreements to promote globally
uniform environmental impact assessment procedures and environmental management practices.
Most groups have so far emphasized identifying new regulatory mechanisms capable of addressing
environmental problems that will emerge with new trading patterns.  Many other possibilities also
exist for providing incentives to the private sector.  For example, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) has been developing a proposed $20-30 million Biodiversity Enterprise Fund for
Latin America.  This would be a private equity fund to mobilize capital to invest in biodiversity-
related projects such as alternative agriculture (organic farming, aquaculture, and the use of under-
utilized species); sustainable forestry; non-timber products from forests and wildlands; ecotourism;
biodiversity prospecting; and other activities that restore or take development pressure off of
biodiversity.  The proposed Fund would be designed to bring together investors, grant funds, and
expertise and making them available to entrepreneurs.
The above discussion touches on just a few of the many possibilities for involving the private sector
in implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity.  Given the immense sums involved in the
private sector, the dependence of many businesses in the private sector on biological resources, and
the realization by many business leaders that their future, too, lies in sustainable development, the
great scope for expanding the collaboration between the private sector and protected areas remains
one of the most promising areas for improvement in the coming years.
6. FINANCING PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS NGOs CAN INITIATE
Conservation finance dates its history from the work of the NGOs that have been raising money and
lobbying for protected areas actively for at least a hundred years.  It is largely as a result of the
lobbying and advocacy efforts of NGOs over the past fifteen years that donors and governments have
increased their support for protected areas.  NGOs are still in the forefront of innovation in bringing
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more investors and more financing to the support of conservation (WRI, 1989; Clark and Downes,
1995; IUCN, 1994; Spergel, 1993).  The following describes tools that NGOs have been, and will
likely continue to be, in the forefront of implementing, often in support of the efforts of governments
and the private sector.
6.1. "Debt-for-Nature" Swaps
Debt-for-nature swaps are the best known of a family of deals that exchange debt in "hard" currency
for local currency and or equity in local enterprises.  The concept of debt swaps is described in many
papers and reports (e.g., Gibson and Schrenk, 1991; Hansen, 1991; Rubin et al., 1994).  One key
feature is worthy of emphasis: these swaps were a "win-win" deal for all involved.  In a typical swap
the commercial bank holding a non-performing note of a developing country was able to get cash (at
a discount over face value) for the note and clear its books.  The Central Bank that redeemed the note
for local currency got out from under a portion of its debt.  The donor, often a philanthropic
foundation in the early days, got more impact for its grant money through a better rate of exchange
for its donation for conservation.  And the international NGO arranging the swap saw an increase not
only in the local currency funding for its projects, but also in the number and amounts of donations
to its programmes.
6.2. Fund Raising from the Public
The general public also has a surprisingly generous willingness to pay for conserving biodiversity,
provided appropriate means are available for them to exercise this choice.  Traditionally, usual way
of expressing this support is through charitable giving, which sometimes can reach very significant
numbers.  For example, in the US, 1993 private sector contribution totaled US$126.22 billion,
including $103 billion from individuals, $9 billion from foundations, $8.5 billion from bequests and
$5.9 billion from corporate foundations.  Funds donated to wildlife and environment issues amounted
to $3.19 billion.
International NGOs have pioneered the art of fund raising targeted at a particular location, species, or
issue.  Examples abound since the beginning of modern conservation efforts.  Indeed many
international NGOs were formed around campaigns to preserve a place in a natural state.  The Sierra
Club had its origins in the campaign to save the Yosemite Valley.  The National Audubon Society
had its origins in a campaign to save egrets from overhunting fueled by demand for feathers as
millinery ornament.
More recently this technique has seen great success in fund raising from the concerned public of
donor countries.  Targeted fund raising works because it gives a sense of ownership to individual
donors.  Whether the cause is tiger or an island, a whale or a coral reef, contributors identify with
the object.  This success has created internal tensions within international conservation NGOs
between scientific and field staff who understand that true security of protected areas depends on
creating a sense of ownership among the people living in and around protected areas.  Directors of
fund raising campaigns have often, against the advice of field staff, allowed their fund-raising
literature to imply that local people are the enemy of conservation, or at least indifferent bystanders,
rather than its stewards.
As countries continue to grow economically, targeted fund raising will see a burst of growth --
especially in countries where television programming is also growing.  Campaigns targeted at
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specific species or locales could generate funds from the urbanized middle class but also could lead to
tension between them and indigenous peoples living in the area targeted by the fund appeal.
Developing strong financial support from the emerging middle classes without also worsening this
tension is the challenge targeted fund raising faces.  If this challenge is met, then countries showing
high rates of economic growth may soon be able to raise substantial amounts of funding for protected
areas.  The key to success is to have representatives of both funders and local communities involved
in the control of flow of such funds.
7. CONCLUSIONS
More funds are required for supporting government efforts to manage protected areas, and this paper
has indicated the breadth of opportunities for innovative sources of funding, and the kinds of policy
reforms required to enable the new funds to be effectively applied to protected areas. Numerous
other possibilities are certainly available and as conditions change in the future, perhaps even more
will become feasible.  The key lesson from this discussion is that funding need not be a limiting
factor for protected areas.  The major requirements for sustainable finance include:
· Establishing new policy frameworks that will facilitate innovation in fund-raising for protected
area-related topics.
 
· Reducing expenditures that tend to operate in ways contrary to the objectives of protected areas.
 
· Designing new approaches for spending money effectively for achieving the national objectives
for protected areas.
The last requirement may be the most difficult to achieve.
This paper has argued that successful management of protected areas requires a combination of
policy reform and appropriate economic instruments.  The policy reforms would remove the
underlying causes of threats to protected areas and create incentives for their effective management.
The economic instruments will further strengthen the incentives for behaviour which is supportive of
the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity and will generate the additional financial
resources required to fund investments in protected areas.
Obviously, some innovative measures will be easier than others.  It would seem reasonable to start
with policy options and financing instruments that promise win-win outcomes, followed by those
which would raise at least sufficient revenue to be self-financing.  Environmental investments that
clearly involve net additional costs should be done last and in increments, with full assessment of the
trade-offs involved. Taken together, the policy changes, innovative funding mechanisms, and
expanded partnerships with the private sector will greatly enhance the prospects for protected areas in
the 21st century.
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